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the West, would distrust too powerful a proconsul in the East Indies. The renewal of the war, by closing Pondicherry to the French, transferred and confined Decaen to the Isle of France, under him the citadel, for seven years, of French power in the east. His activity here this work surveys at large—the restoration in the colony, as in France, of the old centralized régime under new forms; Decaen's futile efforts to promote a French attack in India; finally his surrender in 1810 to an overwhelming English force. On all these points the work is a mine of information. Its interpretation is frank, yet open at times to criticism. Napoleon, for instance, is blamed for neglect of the colonies as against Europe; Decrès for indifference in reinforcing Decaen. Could they do otherwise? Of three vessels sent singly to the Isle of France in the winter of 1808–1809, the English took two.

American readers will be struck by the repetition here, on a smaller scale, of the bickerings and love of display so prominent in the annals of New France. Decaen religiously devoted his salary and allowances, one hundred thousand francs, to the maintenance of his social prestige; while his differences with his associates read like a classic in quarrelsomeness. From his first interview with Decrès he quarrelled with that minister. When Bonaparte taxed him with this, Decaen claimed the First Consul's protection. Bonaparte smiled and promised to be his "champion." At Brest Decaen fell out with his naval colleague, Linois,—an omen of their later intercourse. In the colony, his relations with the prefect were good, with the commissioner of justice, towards the end, bad. In spite of this record he seems on the whole to have been a man genial, popular, a little arbitrary, never bitter. An estimate of his capacity is not easy. Lord Whitworth termed him, before his colonial career, a man not remarkable either as a general or as a statesman. Twenty-seven years later, Sebastiani, in offering him the presidency of a commission on colonial legislation, referred to his "glorious reputation won in the colonies." His civil administration in the east was a success, his military failure no disgrace. Napoleon himself, in 1807, asked Decaen's brother, "Why have the English not taken the Isle of France?" and added, "'Tis their stupidity." His extension and support of the lycée in the colony during his trying régime will compare, for breadth of view, with Humboldt's foundation of the University of Berlin in 1810. And, in his last days, he could say to Gouvion St. Cyr and Soult that thirty years of honorable service in important posts had left him nothing but the satisfaction of having done, at all times, his duty.

H. M. BOWMAN.

*Histoire du Second Empire.* Par PIERRE DE LA GORCE. Tome V. (Paris: Plon, Nourrit et Cie. 1901. Pp. 538.)

IN this, the fifth volume of his history of the Second Empire, M. de la Gorce brings the narrative to the first month of the year 1870. Beginning with the battle of Sadowa he continues his analysis of the Franco-

Prussian relations, discusses the whole matter of the compensations with exceptional skill, and ends his first chapter with the issue of the La Valette circular. Then passing to the Mexican question he completes his study of that unfortunate adventure, leaving Campbell, United States agent in Mexico, with the full responsibility for failing to carry out Seward's instructions to intercede with Juarez for clemency toward Maximilian; and calling the trial of the Emperor an extraordinary travesty of justice (p. 137). Returning to France he takes up the Exposition of 1867 and deals once more with Franco-Prussian relations when "d'abandon en abandon, de concession en concession, nous étions obstinés à concentrer nos désirs sur le Luxembourg." Closing this after an account of the London Congress, with Moustier's apologetic speech to the Chamber, in which the minister declared that the object of France had been less to increase her territory than to protect her frontiers (p. 194), he turns to Italy and analyzes the Franco-Italian relations from the Convention of 1864 to the battle of Mentana. As in previous chapters on Italy, so here, we have the fullest, keenest and most lucid analysis of one of the most involved of Napoleon's intrigues.

Why did the Emperor intervene at Mentana when thereby he alienated the only power in Europe remaining friendly to France at that time? Why did he not allow the Italian government to carry out its policy of occupation of Roman territory when he had already done so much for the Italian cause and had seemed so amenable in the past to the importunities of the Italian diplomatists? Why did he reverse the attitude assumed in 1860 and refuse at this time to listen to such men as Nigra and Pepoli who wished to repeat the ruse that had succeeded so well at Castelfidardo, particularly as Prince Napoleon, La Valette, even Rouher, at this time high in favor with the Emperor, opposed a second expedition to Rome? It will not be enough to cite the Convention of September; that was only a *modus vivendi*. M. de la Gorce finds several reasons: first, a change in Napoleon's own views, for on account of the "grand scandale," the "Imposture" of Castelfidardo, he had lost his old illusions; second, the inferiority of Nigra's diplomacy and cunning, for the Italian ambassador of 1867 was not the equal of Cavour; third, the arguments of Moustier and Niel, who threatened to resign if their counsels should not prevail; fourth, a desire to uphold the papacy and to renew the alliance between the clergy and the empire. But after all, are these the reasons? Each undoubtedly had an influence on Napoleon's mind, but can it be honestly said that Napoleon ever acted on reasoned convictions? He was a man of impulse, Micawber-like waiting until some event turning up at the moment of action, should compel decision. On no other ground can Napoleon's diplomacy be explained.

How was it in this case? The decision had not been rendered when Nigra left Biarritz, nor even after the threats of Moustier and Niel had led to the adoption of intervention in principle. Everything hung in the balance to the end: Nigra was confident on one side that Napoleon would favor Italy; Armand, French secretary of legation at Rome, on

the other, that he would uphold the cause of the Pope. Even in the council of October 25 "l'empereur s'acheminait vers la politique d'action, *mais avec toute sorte de retours*" (p. 295, italics mine). But when the news came of the actual starting of the Garibaldian expedition and of the great alarm in Rome, then fear of revolution in Italy and its possible danger to both Pope and King seemingly impelled Napoleon to a decision. Yet even at the last moment the order wavered. M. de la Gorce gives a remarkable story on page 296, told him by the heirs of Vice-Admiral de Gueydon, according to which the fleet at Toulon was sent, recalled, ordered to lie off the coast within reach of a recall, and then got away under cover of increasing darkness, escaping from those who would wish to have called it back again.

Haphazard diplomacy! How else can it be designated—not only with Italy but still more with Germany? In those portions of the work that will prove most widely interesting—the chapters treating of the relations with Prussia—M. de la Gorce lays stress where a Prussian would not have placed it, upon the weakness, the divided counsels, and the hesitation of France, and not upon the diplomatic greatness of Bismarck. Unlike Sybel, who as a patriotic Prussian is concerned with the merits of Bismarck and other Prussian leaders, M. de la Gorce brings out the good fortune that attended Bismarck and gave him so impotent an enemy to oppose. He gives the Prussian minister full credit for bravery, for diplomatic rashness that was almost genius, but he refuses to deify that statesman, believing that having fathomed the helplessness of the enemy he became hard, unscrupulous, and possessed of little nobility of character. There are many, not Frenchmen, who will agree with this view, and who will follow M. de la Gorce when he speaks of "les iniquités de la Pologne, les sophismes de l'affaire danoise, les brutales hardiesses de la politique prussienne" (p. 66). It is well to have both sides presented: Sybel's glorification of Bismarck, to the neglect of the actual situation in France; de la Gorce's fearful arraignment of the inextricable confusion that prevailed in the French government contrasted with the machine-like precision and simplicity prevailing at Berlin.

I know of no work that brings out this confusion and disorder more strikingly. An emperor, genial and courteous, possessed of a benevolent and humane spirit, liberal by nature, in diplomatic intrigue simple even to *naïveté*, constitutionally an autocrat yet loving to turn to the humblest of his subjects that he might hear his opinion, desirous of repose yet rarely obtaining it, wishing for others contentment, for himself, peace, the recovery of his health, and relief from his cares. Complaisant in consenting that Prussia should annex new millions of inhabitants and hurt because Bismarck would not grant France an equivalent. Consenting to the unity of Northern Germany just as he had consented to the erection of a larger Piedmont, in the forlorn hope that one would mean a dual Germany as the other had been planned to inaugurate a *federated* Italy. Trusting that liberty of the press would draw the nation more closely to him but not realizing that "après la compression des années

précédentes la société impériale était en crise d'indiscipline," and that the chief result would be Rochefort and his *Lanterne*, in which "la société décadente du Second Empire avait rencontré un publiciste à son image" (pp. 400, 401).

And so it was: constantly deceived and constantly disappointed Napoleon maintained to the end views that abroad proved impracticable in the presence of the purposes of Cavour and Bismarck and at home illusory in the face of a declining respect for the empire. But more serious than Napoleon's incapacity and weakness were the divisions everywhere prevailing among the Emperor's advisers. A French Bismarck with so pliable a character to control might have altered essentially the situation though he could not have saved it. But there existed no master mind. The Austrophiles and the Prussophiles, the Catholics and the Italianissimes, the war party and the peace-lovers, conservatives and liberals, all pulling in different directions. Study the debates on the army measures of 1867-1868 (Book XXXIV.), and contrast the plans of the Emperor with the hysterical objections of Marshal Randon, the searching criticisms of Trochu, the hostile attitude of the speakers in the Corps Législatif, and the eventual mutilation of the measures. And so goes the tale through the entire volume: a tale of inefficiency, disunity, selfish ambition, and conceit.

M. de la Gorce has never told a better story or a more scholarly one. We are not surprised that the work has been crowned by the French Academy, receiving the *grand prix* Gobert, and has already passed into a second edition. If Bonapartism were not already dead in France, the vogue of so unvarnished an account of Napoleonic failure would certainly hasten its demise and end what little life remained in the Napoleonic legend of to-day.

CHARLES M. ANDREWS.

*Modern Spain, 1788-1898.* By MARTIN A. S. HUME. [The Story of the Nations.] (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1900. Pp. xxii, 574.)

THIS book may fairly be numbered among the better volumes of the useful but unequal series to which it belongs. Mr. Hume is exceptionally equipped by long residence in the peninsula and by family connections to write the history of modern Spain and he has produced a readable narrative which bears frequent witness to his first-hand knowledge. Although in the main he devotes himself to giving an account of the political vicissitudes of the Spanish people, he does not neglect economic aspects of the period nor fail to pass running comment upon literature and art. One cannot help feeling, however, as he runs upon statements that a moderate degree of specially directed investigation would show to be either hazardous or positively erroneous, that the author, relying with confidence upon his familiarity with Spain and his general reading, has taken his task a little too lightly. The following examples may be given